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Abstract 
 
We test whether the rejections of the expectations hypothesis can be explained by two 
behavioral biases: the law of small numbers and conservatism. We use the term structure to 
decompose excess bond returns into components related to expectation errors and expectation 
revisions, enabling a direct test of behavioral models using the expectations of market 
participants. We find systematic patterns in expectation errors, and expectation revisions, 
which are consistent with these two biases. We show that a trading strategy that exploits these 
biases delivers significant economic profits and that our results are unlikely to be driven by a 
time-varying risk premium.  
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1. Introduction 
The expectations hypothesis (EH) of the term structure of interest rates states that the yield on 
a bond is determined by the expected short yield over the life of the bond plus a constant risk 
premium. The EH is usually tested by examining whether the market’s expectations of future 
changes in bond yields, which are implicit in the term structure of interest rates, are unbiased. 
Empirical evidence from a large number of studies for different countries, different time 
periods and different bond maturities overwhelmingly rejects the EH.
1
  
In this paper, we examine whether this failure of the EH might be accounted for by biases in 
investors’ expectations that arise from two well known behavioral models. The first is the 
‘law of small numbers’ (LSN), which is a type of representativeness bias (see, for example, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The LSN describes the way in which individuals have a 
tendency to expect the moments of a population to be reflected even in short samples of data 
that are drawn from that population. It is motivated by experimental evidence that individuals 
tend to over-extrapolate from short runs of data. The second behavioral bias that we examine 
is ‘conservatism’, which builds on the widespread finding that individuals tend to be too 
conservative when reacting to new information. In particular, agents attach too much weight 
to their current beliefs and too little weight to recent news. Daniel et al. (1998) show that 
overconfidence in prior judgments about stocks can lead to investors giving too little weight 
to new public information compared to the weights that are specified by Bayes’ rule. This 
leads to initial underreaction to new information but, over time, agents learn of their mistake 
and so there are subsequent revisions in expectations that are of the same sign as the initial 
response to the news.  
                                                        
1
 See, for example, Shiller (1979), Shiller et al. (1983), Campbell and Shiller (1984), Mankiw 
and Summers (1984), Mankiw (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1991) and Campbell (1995). 
Hardouvelis (1994) demonstrates that the rejection of the REH is not confined to the US. 
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The bond market offers an opportunity to directly test for the existence of these biases 
because the market’s (risk neutral) expectation at any date for the short yield at any future 
date can be inferred from the term structure. We introduce a decomposition that allows us to 
construct both a series of expectational errors for forecasts at different horizons and a series 
of revisions in those expectations. The first of these components is used to test the short and 
long run implications of the LSN, while the second is used to test the implications of the 
conservatism bias.  
We find systematic patterns in expectation errors and expectation revisions of the short yield 
for US zero-coupon Treasury securities that are consistent with both the LSN and 
conservatism biases. We investigate whether these biases are economically significant by 
examining whether a rational risk-averse investor could profitably exploit these patterns in the 
data. We report Sharpe ratios and Alphas from trading strategies that employ real time out-of-
sample predictions of forecast errors implied by the behavioral models. We find that these 
strategies delivers significant risk-adjusted returns.  
An alternative to the behavioral explanation investigated here, and one that has received 
much more attention, is that the failure of the EH is due to the assumption of a constant risk 
premium. If the risk premium is in fact time-varying it would not be surprising to find that the 
yield spread, which incorporates the risk premium, forecasts excess returns. However, the 
challenge is to develop an economic model that can explain the scale of the rejection of the 
EH. Dai and Singleton (2000) develop a statistical model of risk pricing that can explain the 
findings of Campbell and Shiller (1991) but they do not ground their model in economic 
fundamentals. Similarly, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) interpret their evidence that lagged 
yield spreads forecast excess returns as a statistical model of a time-varying risk premium but 
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acknowledge that their results are not necessarily consistent with an economic model of risk 
pricing.
2
  
A problem for any risk-based explanation is that the volatility of the risk premium would 
have to be considerably higher than could be obtained under plausible levels of risk aversion. 
Backus, Gregory and Zin (1989) use a calibrated representative agent model to show that in a 
standard expected utility framework there cannot be sufficient time-variation in the risk 
premium to explain the scale of the rejection of the EH in the Campbell and Shiller (1991) 
tests. Similarly, Rudebusch and Swanson (2008; page 112) conclude from an investigation of 
the term premium in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework that “these models 
are very far from matching the level and variability of the term premium […] we see in the 
data”. It may be possible to rationalize the size and volatility of the term premium under the 
standard expected utility paradigm if we allow for a more complex specification of risk 
preferences. For example, Wachter (2006) shows that, if external habit persistence is 
introduced in a consumption-based model, the volatility of the term premium is significantly 
higher and many puzzling features of the empirical evidence can be explained. Piazzesi and 
Schneider (2006) calibrate term premia close to those observed in practice by assuming 
Epstein-Zin preferences, combined with the assumption that inflation shocks are negatively 
correlated with consumption shocks. 
Given the attention that a time-varying risk premium has received in the literature, and 
notwithstanding these reservations, we ask whether the results that we report, and which we 
interpret as evidence of behavioral biases, could be explained in this way. We examine 
whether variables that are known to be correlated with the risk premium could be driving the 
explanatory power of our measured expectation errors and revisions. We show that, while 
                                                        
2 
Ludvigson and Ng (2009) extend the model of excess returns estimated by Cochrane and 
Piazzesi (2005) to include real factors, with the same interpretation.  
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lagged yield spreads and some macroeconomic variables do indeed have significant 
explanatory power for excess bond returns, they are almost orthogonal to the expectation 
errors and revisions that we infer from the term structure. This suggests that investors are 
subject to behavioral biases, but at the same time are risk averse, where the risk premium is 
time-varying.   
In the following section, we summarize the theoretical background of the EH and the 
decomposition of excess returns into expectations error and expectations revision 
components. In Section 3, we describe the LSN and conservatism biases and their testable 
implications for expectation errors and expectation revisions. In Section 4, we report the 
empirical results. In Section 5, we investigate the role of a time-varying risk premium. In 
Section 6, we conduct out-of-sample tests of predictability. In Section 7, we assess the 
economic value of the predictive power of the behavioral variables for trading strategies that 
exploit these biases. In Section 8 we allow for a time varying-risk premium and test whether, 
after controlling for risk, behavioral trading strategies earn positive excess returns. Section 9 
concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
Consider an n-period zero coupon bond with unit face value, whose price at time t is   
 . The 
yield to maturity of the bond,   
 , satisfies the relation 
  
  
 
     
   
   
 (1) 
 
or, in natural logarithms, 
  
      
  (2) 
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where   
      
  and   
          
  . If the bond is sold before maturity then the log m-
period holding period return,       
 , where    , is defined as the change in log price, 
    
      
 , which using (2) can be written as 
      
      
      
  
               
           
     (3) 
The EH states that, conditional on the current information set, the expected m-period return 
for two bonds of different maturities,    and   , should be equal for all m except for the 
difference in time-invariant risk premia:  
        
               
         
     
   (4) 
where         is the expectation conditional on the time-t information set,   , and   
   and 
  
   are the constant m-period risk premia on the two bonds. This gives rise to a number of 
implications concerning the relationship between the current yield spread (the difference 
between the yields of long and short maturity bonds) and (a) the change in the long yield over 
the life of the short bond and (b) the cumulative change in the short yield over the life of the 
long bond. Empirical tests of these implications invariably lead to a strong rejection of the 
EH (see, for example, Campbell and Shiller, 1991).  
To explore the reasons behind the rejection of the EH, it is useful to recast the EH in terms of 
the holding period return relative to a risk free investment. By setting      and      in 
(4), we can define the excess return as the difference between the uncertain m-period return 
on an n-period bond (the long bond) and the certain m-period return on an m-period bond (the 
short bond): 
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   (5) 
Under the EH, this excess return should be unforecastable. In the equity market, tests of 
behavioral biases have focused on the time series properties of abnormal returns. In 
particular, it has been widely reported that unexpected equity returns display positive serial 
correlation at short horizons (momentum) and negative serial correlation at longer horizons 
(reversals) (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).  
The evidence of momentum and reversals in equity returns is, in principle, consistent with a 
behavioral explanation of expectations formation. However, without further assumptions, it is 
not possible to directly test such an explanation in the equity market using expectation errors 
and expectation revisions since these are not separately identifiable in equity returns. In the 
bond market, however, we have the advantage that the cash flows (i.e. the coupons and the 
face value of the bond) are known with certainty and so we are able to decompose excess 
bond returns into the part due to errors in expectations about future short yields and the part 
due to expectation revisions about future short yields. This allows us to directly test the 
implications of behavioral biases for the time series properties of realized expectation errors 
and for the time series of revisions in expectations. 
To do so, we first write the excess return in terms of expectations about the ‘fundamental’ 
short yield. By setting        and      in (3) and (4), we can write the yield on an n-
period bond as the sum of current and expected future short yields over the n-period life of 
the long bond: 
  
  
 
 
       
 
   
   
   
  
 (6) 
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Substituting into (5) then leads to the following decomposition of excess returns, which is the 
basis for the tests of the behavioral models set out in Section 4:  
      
     
         
 
   
   
       
             
 
     
   
     
         
 
   
   
    
    
  
                   
        
               
          
  
     
   
   
    
  
 (7) 
 
Equation (7) states that, under the EH, over the life of an m-period bond, the difference 
between the uncertain return on an n-period bond and the certain return on the m-period bond 
can be decomposed into (i) the difference between the short yield at time     and the 
market’s expectation at time t of that short yield (i.e. an expectation error term), (ii) the 
revision in expectations between time t and time     of the short yield between time 
      and time n, the maturity of the long bond (i.e. an expectation revision term) and 
(iii) a constant risk premium term. Intuitively, (i) implies that, if the short yield at time     
is higher than expected at time t, this will result in a lower holding period return for the n 
period bond while (ii) implies that, if the expectation of short yields between time       
and time n are higher at time     than at time t, then this too will depress holding period 
returns on the n period bond bought at time t and held until time m. Under the EH, the 
expected value of both the expectation error term and the expectation revision term should be 
zero. The evidence against the EH, which is a joint hypothesis of rational expectations and 
constant risk premia, can therefore be thought of as potentially arising from systematically 
biased expectations that give rise to predictability in the expectation errors and expectation 
revisions of the short yield. In the following section, we describe two behavioral models that 
have been used to explain such biases in the equity market. 
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3. Behavioral Models of Expectations Formation 
A. The Law of Small Numbers 
The Law of Small Numbers (LSN) describes the belief that a randomly drawn sample of data 
will reflect the characteristics of the population from which it is drawn more closely than 
sampling theory would predict. The LSN is related to two specific behavioral biases that have 
been documented in the psychology literature. The first is ‘base rate neglect’, which describes 
the finding that subjects put too little weight on the unconditional probability of observing a 
particular sample. The second is ‘sample size neglect’, which describes the finding that 
subjects overestimate the statistical relevance of information that is contained in the sample 
(see Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). Both base rate neglect and sample size neglect cause 
subjects to overweight (compared to a Bayesian) the importance of a given sample of data 
when making inferences about the population from which it is drawn. Barberis et al. (1998) 
and Rabin (2002) derive the implications of the LSN for returns in equity markets and show 
that it results in momentum in abnormal returns in the short run, an empirical feature of 
equity returns that is well documented. The LSN has similar implications for the bond 
market. Assume that the short yield follows an autoregressive process with i.i.d. shocks and 
that this model is known. Under the LSN, agents will be too confident (compared to a 
Bayesian) that they will see equal numbers of positive and negative shocks in short samples 
of data. This implies that, if the shock is negative in one period so that the forecast error is 
negative, investors will expect the following period’s shock to be positive with probability 
greater than 50%. Thus, their short yield forecast will be higher than is implied by the 
autoregressive model. However, under the true model, the next period’s innovation is positive 
with 50 percent probability and hence investors will experience a second negative surprise 
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with more than 50 percent probability. The LSN therefore predicts that there will be positive 
short run serial correlation in one-step ahead forecast errors for the short yield.  
In terms of the decomposition given by (7), this bias leads to positive serial correlation in the 
first component of the excess return (the expectations error component), contributing to 
positive serial correlation in excess returns over short horizons. This leads to the following 
testable hypothesis: 
H1: yt m
1 E tyt m
1
 is positively serially correlated for small values of m. 
So far we have described the implications of the LSN for one-step ahead forecast errors given 
agents’ beliefs about the model that generated the sample. But the fact that subjects tend to 
overweight (compared to a Bayesian) the importance of a given sample of data also has 
implications for how subjects revise their beliefs about the model in the light of runs of data. 
If agents expect relatively small samples to closely reflect population moments then this 
implies that, when they observe a series of observations that do not accord with their original 
beliefs, they too readily interpret this as evidence that their original beliefs were incorrect. 
They therefore update their beliefs about the model too quickly relative to a Bayesian. Over 
time, this leads to fluctuation in agents’ beliefs about the model parameters around their true 
values. Assuming that successive samples are drawn randomly, beliefs about the model 
parameter values will therefore exhibit negative serial correlation.  
In order to test this long term implication of the LSN in the bond market, we note that, if 
beliefs about the model parameters exhibit negative serial correlation, forecast errors (which 
in part reflect model errors) will inherit this negative serial correlation. We cannot expect to 
detect this using short term forecasts because, although they reflect beliefs about the model, 
short term forecast errors will be dominated by the short term implications of the LSN 
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discussed above. In order to detect negative serial correlation in forecast errors that result 
from model error, we focus on errors in long term forecasts since it is these that will more 
clearly reflect mistaken beliefs about the systematic part of the model. The LSN therefore 
predicts that there will be negative serial correlation in the long term forecast and so we test 
the following hypothesis: 
H2: yt m
1 E tyt m
1
 is negatively serially correlated for large values of m. 
B. The Conservatism Bias 
‘Conservatism’ describes a subject’s response to new information. It describes the possibility 
that individuals are too slow to revise their beliefs, effectively attaching too much weight to 
their prior beliefs about the true model and too little weight to new information. Daniel et al. 
(1998) build on the closely related ‘overconfidence bias’, which has similar testable 
implications. They show that this bias can lead to underreaction to news as agents’ 
expectations following the news are not immediately revised to the full extent that would be 
justified by Bayesian updating. However, over time agents learn of their initial underreaction 
and so there are subsequent revisions in agents’ expectations that are of the same sign as the 
initial response to the news announcement. This process is consistent with evidence of 
momentum in returns and is further confirmed in the equity market by evidence of 
underreaction to public news such as earnings announcements. 
The existence of conservatism implies that the revisions in expectations of future short yields 
that we observe each period will typically be too small resulting in further revisions of the 
same sign in subsequent periods.
3
 This leads to a third testable hypothesis:  
                                                        
3 If investors learn of their initial underreaction immediately, then they will adjust their 
expectations the following period, leading to serial correlation in one-period expectation 
revisions. More generally, however, it is possible that this process could extend for more than 
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H3: E t myt m i
1 Etyt m i
1
 is positively serially correlated for small values of m and i.  
In the following section, we examine the evidence for momentum and return reversals in the 
bond market and report the results of testing hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. 
 4. Empirical Evidence 
A. Data 
We use the synthetic monthly zero-coupon bond yields on US Treasury securities for the 
period January 1952 to December 2012. We update the zero coupon bond yield data 
estimated by Bulkley, Harris and Nawosah (2011), which ended in December 2009, to 
December 2012 and use the extended data set in this paper. The data are continuously 
compounded and recorded as annualized percentages.  
Following Fama (2006) and Bulkley, Harris and Nawosah (2011), we include a dummy 
variable in all the regressions that we estimate to capture the significant structural break in 
bond yields of all maturities that occurred in 1980-81. Structural stability tests suggest a 
breakpoint between June 1981 and June 1982 depending on the regression estimated. For 
consistency, we assume a common breakpoint at December 1981. To investigate the 
robustness of our findings, we report results for the post-break sample from January 1982 to 
December 2012. We additionally consider the much shorter sample from January 2008 to 
December 2012, which follows the recent financial crisis. 
B. Evidence on Momentum and Return Reversals  
We first investigate whether our sample exhibits the stylized features of short term 
momentum and long term return reversals that have been documented in many asset markets 
                                                                                                                                                                            
one period and so we test for serial correlation in m-period expectation revisions. 
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and many countries (see for example Cutler, Poterba, and Summers, 1991; Asness, 
Moskowitz, and Pedersen, 2013). In particular, we estimate the degree of serial correlation in 
excess holding period returns using the following regression: 
t,t m
n
1 1Dt 1 t m,t
n
1,t m (8) 
where the m-period excess holding period return for an n-period bond, t,t m
n
, is defined by 
equation (7) and Dt  is a dummy variable that is set to one after December 1981 and zero 
otherwise. Table 1 reports the results of estimating regression (8) for n = 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 
48, 60 and 120 months and m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months for the full 1952-
2012 sample.
4
 The regression is estimated by OLS and standard errors are computed using 
the Newey and West (1987) estimator to allow for the fact that the dependent variable is 
overlapping. To limit the size of the table, we only report the estimated slope coefficients and 
omit the intercept and dummy coefficients.
5
 Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. It is worth noting at the outset that Table 1 has a banding structure that clearly 
highlights the pattern of results expected: the first column has elements that are significantly 
positive (consistent with short-run momentum), whereas the bottom-right triangle groups 
coefficients that are significantly negative (consistent with long-term reversals). In particular, 
for the shortest holding period of one month (in the first column), we find very significant 
positive serial correlation in excess holding period returns for all but the longest bond 
maturity. This evidence complements that of Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013), who 
report strong evidence of momentum in real bond yields for one month holding periods for 10 
countries. However, in contrast with Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), who find 
                                                        
4
 Note that yt m
n m
 needs to be approximated in a number of cases due to the unavailability of 
the certain maturities in our dataset. Here and elsewhere in the paper, we linearly interpolate 
between the yields of adjacent maturities to approximate the missing yields. 
5
 We note that the coefficient on the dummy variable is strongly significant in most cases, 
suggesting the importance of the structural break.  
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momentum in government bond returns for holding horizons of up to one year, we do not find 
significant evidence of momentum at horizons of longer than one month.  
For longer holding periods between 24 and 120 months, there is very significant negative 
serial correlation in excess holding period returns for longer maturity bonds, suggesting that 
there are return reversals in excess holding period returns in the bond market. This is stronger 
evidence than reported by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1991), who find using US data 
1960-1988 only weak evidence of negative autocorrelation at longer lags (although they do 
find negative autocorrelation at longer horizons for a sample of 12 other countries). The 
pattern of momentum and return reversals in our data is similar to that reported in U.S. equity 
data (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), although the horizon over which there 
is significant momentum in excess returns in our sample is shorter than the six to twelve 
months typically found in the equity market.   
To conserve space, the results of estimating regression (8) for the two sub-samples are 
reported in the web appendix. Table A.1 reports the results for the 1982-2012 sample, while 
Table A.2 reports the results for the 2008-2012 sample. As documented in the web appendix, 
the evidence largely confirms the existence of momentum and reversals in the two shorter 
periods.  
[Table 1] 
C. Expectation Errors and the LSN  
We next test the implications of the LSN for expectation errors. In Tables 2 and 3 we report 
the results of estimating the following regression: 
mttmtttmttmt yEyDyEy   ,2
11
222
11 )(   (9) 
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where mt
m
tmtt myymyE 


11 )1(  is the forecast of y t m
1
 that is implicit in the current term 
structure of interest rates. The evidence for the short-run implications of the LSN (hypothesis 
H1) comes from small values of m, while for the long-run implications (hypothesis H2), we 
are interested in larger values of m. Table 2 reports the results of estimating (9) for m = 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6 months. For the full 1952-2012 sample, there is very significant positive serial 
correlation in one-step ahead expectation errors for the short yield for horizons of one and 
two months. For longer horizons, there is no significant serial correlation. In the 1982-2012 
sample, the evidence of positive serial correlation in one-step ahead expectation errors is even 
stronger and is statistically significant up to the 6-month horizon. In the 2008-2012 sample, 
there is evidence of positive serial correlation in one-step ahead expectation errors up to the 
6-month horizon, although it is generally weaker than in the 1982-2012 sample.  
[Table 2] 
Table 3 reports the results of testing the long run implications of the LSN using regression (9) 
with lags of m = 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60 and 120 months. For the full 1952-2012 sample, the 
estimated slope coefficient is insignificant for lags of 9, 12 and 18 months, becoming 
significantly negative for horizons of 24, 36, 48, 60 months. It is not surprising that there is 
an interval in which the slope coefficient is insignificant since at intermediate horizons the 
short and long term implications of the LSN act in opposite directions. The evidence suggests 
that it is at the 4-year horizon that the impact of fluctuating beliefs about model parameters is 
strongest. Under the LSN we explain this negative serial correlation as a result of agents 
revising their model too much in response to recent data, resulting in beliefs about parameters 
that fluctuate about their true value. Long run forecast errors will, in part, reflect model error 
and hence inherit the negative serial correlation. The effect becomes attenuated at longer 
horizons because, as the sample size increases, the sample moments more closely match the 
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population moments and so agents do not see a need to revise their beliefs about the true 
model. The pattern of evidence in the 1982-2012 sample is generally similar, although the 
slope coefficient becomes significantly positive for the 120-month bond. We do not report 
results for the 2008-2012 sample because it is too short for reliable inference given the long 
horizons considered.  
[Table 3] 
D. Expectation Revisions and the Conservatism Bias 
Table 4 reports the results of the test of the conservatism bias, hypothesis H3, which is that 
expectation revisions are positively serially correlated at short lags. To test this hypothesis, 
we estimate the following regression: 
mtitmtitttimttimtmt yEyEDyEyE   ,3
11
333
11 )(   (10) 
where kt
k
tktt kyykyE 


11 )1( . The regression is estimated for horizons i = 1 to 12 months 
and lag m = 1 month. For the 1952-2012 sample, consistent with hypothesis H3, there is 
positive serial correlation in the one-step ahead expectation revisions for the short yield at all 
horizons except one month. The pattern of serial correlation increases with the time horizon 
up to three months and then generally declines. In all cases, there is statistically significant 
positive serial correlation in expectation revisions, strongly supporting the prediction of the 
conservatism bias. The results for the 1982-2012 sample also support the conservatism bias, 
although with an even greater degree of positive serial correlation for the 1-month and 2-
month horizons. For the 2008-2012 sample, positive serial correlation is observed for 
horizons of one to five months. For the remaining horizons, the serial correlation is not 
significantly different from zero. 
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 [Table 4] 
 
5. Time-Varying Risk Premia  
The measures of expectation errors and revisions employed in the tests reported above are 
inferred from the term structure under the assumption of a constant risk premium. However, 
if the risk premium is in fact time-varying, this will introduce measurement error into the 
inferred expectation errors and revisions. In this section, we examine whether the dynamic 
properties of expectation errors and revisions can be explained by time-variation in the risk 
premium. We re-estimate equations (9) and (10) adding a range of financial and 
macroeconomic risk factors that have been suggested as proxies for the risk premium. In 
particular, we consider Cochrane and Piazzesi's (2005) five forward rates, which are widely 
used in the recent empirical literature, and a set of standard macroeconomic variables used in 
prior research. These include the inflation rate ( ) as measured by the change in the log of the 
US CPI index, a measure of business cycle activity or output gap (     due to Cooper and 
Priestley (2009), a measure of economic growth ( ) defined as the change in the log of the 
industrial production index, the change in the unemployment rate (  ), and a measure of 
bond market volatility (   ) constructed using the rolling 12-month standard deviation of the 
log change in the 10-year Treasury yield.
6,7
 The changes are measured over the previous 
                                                        
6
 See for example Cochrane and Piazzasi (2002), Kim and Moon (2005), Cooper and 
Priestley (2009), Ludvigson and Ng (2009), Duffee (2012) and the references therein. The 
recent macro-finance literature also recognizes the importance of macroeconomic variables 
related to inflation and real activity as determinants of bond risk premia, see for example Ang 
and Piazzesi (2003), Rudebusch and Wu (2004), Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008), Christensen, 
Lopez, and Rudebusch (2010) and Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2012) amongst others. 
7
 Following Cooper and Priestley (2009), gap is measured by the deviation of the log of the 
industrial production index from a trend that includes both a linear and a quadratic 
component.  
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month.
8
  
The augmented versions of (9) and (10) take the following form:    
                       
       
                (11) 
                           
       
                 (12) 
where                     and                   
          
  are the dependent 
variables from equations (9) and (10), respectively.        
        
  and            
  
        
  represent the behavioral predictors from equations (9) and (10), respectively. 
Henceforth, the acronyms FE and ER are used to refer to forecast error and expectation 
revision, respectively.    is a vector containing Cochrane and Piazzesi's (2005) one-year 
yield and 2-5 year forward rates,         
      
      
      
     
  
 
.       is a vector that groups 
together the macroeconomic variables,                        .    ,   ,    and    are      
vectors of regression coefficients.
9
 
To save space, we report the results only for the full 1952-2012 sample. We also restrict 
attention to selected horizons and refer to the web appendix for full-length tables containing 
results for the full set of horizons considered earlier in the paper. Tables 5 and 6 report the 
results from estimating equation (11) for a variety of specifications for short and long 
horizons, respectively. Panel A of each table presents results for the specification including 
the CP forward rates only, Panel B for the specification including the macro variables only, 
and Panel C for the specification including both the CP forward rates and the macro 
                                                        
8
 The results that follow are similar when changes are measured on a year-on-year basis. 
Also, it makes little difference to the conclusions when we lag macro variables by a month to 
account for the delay in the release of macroeconomic data or use annual averages of the 
forward rates and selected macro variables instead in our regressions.  
9
 We tested specifications of equations (11) and (12) that include Ludvigson and Ng's (2009) 
latent factors in place of the observed macroeconomic risk factors for the 1964-2007 period 
for which these factors are available, and the conclusions that we draw are generally similar.    
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variables. Comparing Table 2 with Table 5 (and Table B.1 in the web appendix), we see that 
at short horizons the risk proxies substantially improve the     in all three specifications and 
at almost all horizons. Although their significance varies between horizons their importance 
is nevertheless evident across the three specifications. However, it is notable that while the 
risk proxies are statistically significant, they appear to be approximately orthogonal to the 
behavioral variable. In particular the size and statistical significance of the coefficient on    
at the 1-month horizon is only very marginally affected, irrespective of the risk proxies 
used.
10
  
[Table 5] 
In Table 6 (and Table B.2 in the web appendix), we see that the predictive power of the 
regressions improves substantially, suggesting that the risk variables do matter at long 
horizons. However, the significance of the FE variable is again essentially unchanged at 
horizons of between two and five years in both samples, irrespective of the risk proxies used.  
 [Table 6] 
The results of estimating equation (12) for horizons i = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months are 
reported in Table 7. In Table B.3 in the web appendix, we report the results for all horizons 
from 1 to 12 months. The risk premium variables also appear to be important determinants of 
expectation revisions. However, the slope coefficient on the ER variable remains significant 
at all horizons except one month and across all three specifications. These results are similar 
to those reported in Table 4.  
[Table 7] 
                                                        
10
 We also note that in the post-1981 sample, the coefficient on FE is found to be strongly 
significant at all horizons up to four months. The results for the post-2007 sample are weaker 
but the coefficient on FE remains significant in several cases. 
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To summarize, the explanatory power of the behavioral variables is only marginally affected 
by the introduction of proxies for a time-varying risk premium. Although a time-varying risk 
premium and behavioral models are sometimes viewed as competing explanations, there is no 
reason for these two models to be mutually exclusive. In particular, there is no reason why 
agents who exhibit behavioral biases in forming expectations should not also be risk averse in 
an environment where risk is time-varying.  
6. Out-of-Sample Forecasting Performance  
In this section we examine whether an investor trading in real time, with only past data 
available to estimate a model of expectation errors, could have exploited these behavioral 
biases to predict forecast errors. In this out-of-sample analysis, forecasts are generated using 
a recursive estimation scheme with an initial window size of 60 months. Model parameters 
are estimated every month using data up to month t, that is, forecast errors and revisions in 
month t are regressed on lagged predictors, measured in month t-m or month t-i depending on 
the regression used, and then out-of-sample m-step, or i-step, ahead predictions are generated 
using the estimated parameters and predictors measured in month t. Again, a variety of 
regression specifications for equations (11) and (12) are used to construct the out-of-sample 
forecasts.  
Since our main concern is the relative performance of the behavioral variables versus the risk 
premium proxies, we apply two out-of-sample forecast encompassing tests to examine the 
incremental predictive ability of the two sets of variables. The first test is based on Mincer-
Zarnowitz (1969) regressions of the following form:  
                 
          
           (13) 
                     
            
              (14) 
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where      
   is the time t+m forecast of the forecast error based on equation (9) and      
     is 
the forecast based on equation (11) including only the risk factors.      
          
   when only 
the CP forward rates are used as predictors,      
          
      when only the macro variables 
are used and      
          
         when both the CP forward rates and the macro variables are 
used. Similarly,        
   is the predicted forecast revision based on equation (10) and        
     
is the prediction based on equation (12) including only the risk factors.        
            
   
when only the CP forward rates are used as predictors,        
            
      when only macro 
variables are used, and        
            
         when both the CP forward rates and macro 
variables are used. We make inferences about the predictive ability of the behavioral variables 
and the risk proxies by comparing the relative size and significance of the slope coefficients 
of the competing forecasts entering equations (13) and (14).  
The second test is based on the ENC-NEW statistic suggested by Clark and McCraken 
(2001). The null hypothesis of the test is that the restricted model forecasts encompass the 
unrestricted model forecasts. To implement this test, we compare out-of-sample forecasts 
from an unrestricted specification of equation (11) (equation (12)) that includes both    (  ) 
and a combination of the risk factors to those based on a restricted model that includes only 
the risk factors. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests that the unrestricted model contains 
incremental information or, in other words, the behavioral variables contain additional 
information that is not contained in the risk factors. Bootstrapped critical values provided in 
Clark and McCraken (2001, 2005) are used to evaluate the statistical significance of the test 
statistic. We also report the out of sample     from the above encompassing regressions.  
The results of the encompassing tests are summarized in Tables 8, 9 and 10. The results 
reported in Table 8 show that both FE-based and risk-based forecasts have predictive power. 
For both sets of forecasts, the slope coefficient is positive and significantly greater than zero 
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at the 1-month horizon, whichever set of risk factors is used. The ENC-NEW statistic is also 
strongly statistically significant at the 1-month horizon for all three specifications. These 
results confirm that the in-sample short run LSN evidence reported in Table 5 also holds out-
of-sample suggesting that the risk-based models do not encompass the FE-based model.  
[Table 8] 
The results in Table 9 confirm the evidence in favor of the long run implications of the LSN 
for all horizons found in Table 6, except 60 months. The slope coefficient of the risk-based 
forecasts is significantly greater than zero in only one case and even turns negative in many 
cases, whereas the slope coefficient of the behavioral forecasts is generally significant (and 
positive) for horizons of 24, 36 and 48 months and, to some extent, 18 months. This suggests 
that the behavioral forecasts dominate the CP forecasts for these horizons. The ENC-NEW 
test statistic is strongly significant for horizons of 18 months and longer, providing evidence 
that there is incremental information in the FE variable.
11
  
[Table 9] 
Table 10 reports the out-of-sample results for the ER-based forecasts relative to the risk-based 
forecasts. The encompassing regression results in Panel A confirm the in-sample findings in 
Panel A of Table 7. Although the slope coefficient on the CP forecasts is significantly positive 
in several cases, we see that the risk-based forecasts do not encompass the ER-based forecasts 
for most horizons. This is strongly supported by the ENC-NEW test. The results in Panel B 
and Panel C are slightly weaker but they nevertheless overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis 
that the risk-based forecasts encompass the ER-based forecasts.  
                                                        
11 Comparing the encompassing     to the     from the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression that 
includes only risk-based forecasts (not reported), we observe an increase in the forecasting 
performance generally, again indicating that the FE variable contains incremental 
information. 
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[Table 10] 
7. The Economic Value of Predictability 
Given that the behavioral variables forecast expectation errors and expectation revisions, both 
in-sample and out-of-sample, it is natural to ask whether bond market investors could have 
profitably exploited this predictability. In this section we report Sharpe ratios for trading rules 
based on the behavioral variables and risk proxies. We also assess the significance of the 
difference in Sharpe ratios between the different strategies using the Jobson and Korkie 
(1981) methodology with the correction proposed in Memmel (2003). We start by reporting 
real time trading profits for equally-weighted portfolios of selected bonds.
12
 We use two 
specific trading rules, both of which are self-financing. The first rule (Strategy A) is a 
long/short strategy that involves holding one unit of a portfolio of long bonds and shorting 
one unit of the short bond if the portfolio's predicted excess return is positive, and vice versa. 
The second rule (Strategy B) involves taking a long or short position in a portfolio of long 
bonds (and an opposite position of equal size in the short bond), with the size of the position 
suggested by the portfolio's predicted excess return, following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). 
We produce out-of-sample forecasts of excess returns based on the same recursive procedure 
with a 5-year initial estimation window as in Section 6. The m-step ahead forecasts are 
generated recursively from the following excess return regression:  
 
 
        
 
                        (15) 
where the dependent variable is the difference between the average m-month return across   
n-month long bonds and the certain return on the short m-month bond and represents the 
excess return on the portfolio of these   bonds. m is the holding horizon and we consider 
                                                        
12
 The analysis is also performed on individual maturity bonds and, as expected, the pattern of 
the results is similar.   
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horizons m = 1, ..., 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months.   collects the maturity values (in months) 
for the full set of long bonds used to form the portfolios:                               . 
The values taken by n depend on the horizon under consideration. The number of bonds used 
decreases with horizon: all 10 bonds are used for m = 1, the 9 bonds with maturities of 3 to 
120 months for m = 2, and so on. The right hand side variables,   , are either the behavioral 
variables or the risk proxies. The strategy that exploits expectation errors (the FE strategy) is 
based on forecasts from equation (15) when       , as defined above, and the strategy that 
trades on expectation revisions (the ER strategy) is based on forecasts when       . 
Similarly, risk-based    and          strategies are based on forecasts when        and 
               ', respectively.  
Once the forecasts of excess returns have been produced, we proceed to calculate the trading 
strategy profits. Under Strategy A, the profits are  
 
 
        
 
     when the portfolio's 
predicted excess return is positive, and   
 
 
        
 
           when the portfolio's 
predicted excess return is negative. Under Strategy B, the profits are calculated as:  
 
 
 
        
 
        
 
 
        
 
          (16) 
where the size of the position is equal to    
 
 
        
 
    , expressed as an annual 
percentage to be consistent with Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005). If the sign of the portfolio's 
excess return is correctly predicted, Strategy B results in a profit, otherwise it results in a loss. 
The trading rule profits from the two strategies are thus a multiple of $1 each month. 
After calculating the time series of the out-of-sample trading rule returns for the various 
strategies, we evaluate their performance using Sharpe ratios. We also assess the significance 
of the difference in Sharpe ratios between the behavioral strategy and the two risk-based 
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strategies using the corrected Jobson and Korkie (1981) test.13 Given that our trading rule 
returns are serially correlated, we pre-whiten the time series by fitting appropriate ARMA 
models prior to performing the test.  
Table 11, Panel A, compares the performance of the FE strategy to the CP and CP+Macro 
strategies for holding horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. For Strategy 
A, we see that the FE strategy attains a higher Sharpe ratio than the risk-based strategies in all 
cases and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in all but two cases. For 
Strategy B, again, the FE strategy always achieves a higher Sharpe ratio than the risk-based 
benchmarks but the differences in performance are generally larger than under Strategy A. 
The difference in Sharpe ratios between the FE strategy and both the CP and CP+Macro 
strategies is statistically significant for all horizons.  
[Table 11] 
Panel B of Table 11 presents the results for the ER strategy against the risk-based strategies 
for horizons m = 2 to 12 months. We can see from both panels that the Sharpe ratios of the ER 
strategy exceed those of the risk-based strategies in most cases. For Strategy A, the results are 
mixed for horizons up to 6 months. Comparing the results of the ER strategy with those of the 
CP strategy, we see that the ER strategy has higher Sharpe ratios for all horizons, although 
the differences are significant only at horizons longer than 6 months. However, the Shape 
ratios of the ER strategy are significantly higher than the CP+Macro strategy in all cases 
except 2 and 4 months. The results for Strategy B present a stronger picture: the ER strategy 
                                                        
13 We also employ the robust studentized time series bootstrap procedure of Ledoit and Wolf 
(2008) using a grid of block sizes that includes the value of the overlap of the data. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those of the Jobson and Korkie (1981) test.  
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achieves higher Sharpe ratios in all cases and the differences are all statistically significant.
14
  
Overall, the superior performance of the behavioral strategies suggests that the predictive 
ability of the behavioral variables is robust and that trading on the basis of expectation errors 
and revisions would add economic value beyond that which would be expected in 
compensation for risk.  
8. Factor Mimicking Portfolios and Strategy Alphas  
To further check the robustness of our results, we construct portfolios mimicking the risk 
factors and directly test whether the alphas of our behavioral strategies with respect to these 
mimicking portfolios are significantly different from zero. Factor mimicking portfolios are 
estimated by projecting each original (non-traded) risk factor onto the span of tradable asset 
returns. We construct six mimicking portfolios, one for each of our five macro variables and 
one for the CP factor. Only one portfolio is constructed to mimic the information in the CP 
forward rates. The CP single forward-rate factor (see Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)), which is 
a linear combination of the forward rates, is used as the original risk factor in the 
construction. The single factor, denoted CPF, is estimated out-of-sample recursively and 
measured at the one-month horizon. Regarding the choice of base assets, we consider six 
equity portfolios and two bond portfolios from the wide range of assets commonly used in the 
related literature. The equity portfolios are the six Fama-French benchmark portfolios sorted 
on size and book-to-market and the bond portfolios include a portfolio of intermediate 
                                                        
14
 We also extended the analysis to calculate the utility-based certainty equivalent (CE) return 
gains for each strategy (see, for example, Brennan and Xia (2004) and Campbell and 
Thompson (2008)). Using a range of values for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we 
find that the CE gains for the behavioral strategies are almost always positive and 
considerable in size (well over 100 basis points in most cases) compared to the (often 
negative) values obtained for the risk-based strategies.  
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Treasury bonds and a portfolio of long Treasury bonds.
15, 16
  
Following Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenburger (1989) and Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014), we 
estimate the asset weights for the mimicking portfolios by regressing each risk variable on the 
excess returns (over the risk free rate) of each of the base assets.
17
 For each risk variable 
                         , we run the following regression:  
         
            (17) 
where    is a vector that collects the monthly excess returns of the base assets,    is the 
intercept and    is an      vector of slope coefficients. We normalize the sum of the 
portfolio weights to one in each case. The monthly return on the mimicking portfolio for risk 
variable   is then given by: 
       
     .  (18) 
Once we have the factor mimicking portfolio returns, we evaluate the performance of our 
behavioral strategies using the alphas from time-series regressions of the following form:  
                        
           (19) 
where     denotes the out-of-sample trading rule returns for             strategy for a 
horizon of m months,      denotes the excess returns on a portfolio of long-term Treasury 
                                                        
15
 The six Fama-French portfolio returns are downloaded from Kenneth French's data library. 
In unreported results, we also incorporate industry sorted portfolios, a momentum portfolio 
and the US stock market portfolio (the CRSP value-weighted index of all stocks). The results 
are similar to those reported below when we use different permutations of the expanded set of 
base assets.  
16
 Note that, in estimating the portfolio that mimics CPF, we drop the intermediate bond 
porfolio that includes 2-5 year bonds which also enter the calculation of CPF. Excluding the 
long bond portfolio as well generates similar results.  
17
 Including a set of control variables (the term spread, default spread, short rate, dividend 
yield, lagged inflation, lagged growth and lagged stock market return) has little effect on the 
results.  
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bonds measured over the same m-month horizon (used as a proxy for the bond market 
portfolio) and    is a vector containing the monthly mimicking portfolio returns,   
                      
 
.     is the intercept (alpha),     is the slope coefficient on 
     and     is a      vector of slope coefficients for the mimicking portfolios.
18
 In 
unreported results, we analyze the correlations between the mimicking portfolios and the 
original risk variables. The absolute correlations range from 0.10 to 0.25, which are 
consistent with the values reported in the literature. We also examine the correlations between 
the returns on the six mimicking portfolios. The absolute correlations range from 0.45 to 
0.94. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we ensure that no correlation coefficient between the 
mimicking portfolios included in the regressions exceed a value of 0.8 and this is achieved by 
dropping      and   . Furthermore, an examination of the mean-variance properties of the 
mimicking portfolios reveals that the mimicking portfolios are located much closer to the 
tangency portfolio than are the base assets. This is reflected in the higher Sharpe ratios of the 
mimicking portfolios. 
[Table 12] 
Owing to space constraints, we report results only for the long/short strategy that involves 
holding one unit of a portfolio of long bonds and shorting one unit of the short bond if the 
portfolio's predicted excess return is positive, and vice versa (Strategy A). It is worth noting 
that the results are much stronger for both FE- and ER-based strategies when the size of the 
                                                        
18
 We perform further sensitivity checks on our results. While the mimicking portfolios in the 
paper use fixed weights, we also construct mimicking portfolios with time-varying weights 
(see, for example, Ferson and Harvey (1991)). We also experimented with alternative 
horizons over which the risk variables and the base asset returns are measured, in particular 
by matching the holding horizons of our trading strategies. We also estimated a variety of 
specifications for equation (19), with and without the excess returns on long bonds: for 
example, we introduce each mimicking factor by itself as well as evaluate the role of the 
macro portfolios separately from the CP portfolio. The main conclusions that we draw from 
the wide array of sensitivity analyses are unaltered. These results are available from the 
authors.   
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long or short position in a portfolio of long bonds varies with the portfolio's predicted excess 
return (Strategy B). Panel A of Table 12 presents the results of estimating equation (19) for 
the FE-based strategy for holding horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. 
The bond market portfolio does very well in capturing the variation in the strategy returns. 
The beta estimates are positive and highly significant for horizons up to 24 months. 
Regarding the contribution of the portfolios constructed to mimic the risk factors related to 
CP and macroeconomic factors, a similar picture to the results reported in Tables 5-6 
emerges. The loadings on the mimicking portfolios are significant in several cases, at least at 
the 10% level.   ,    and      appear to be the most relevant return factors. Despite their 
importance, the bond market factor and the mimicking portfolios leave a significant fraction 
of the FE-strategy returns unexplained. The estimated alphas are strongly significant in all 
cases and in the range of 1.0% to 1.6% per annum in the majority of cases.
19
 
In Panel B of Table 12, we present the results for the ER-based strategy for horizons m = 2 to 
12 months. Again, the bond market factor proves to be important and the evidence on the 
explanatory power of the mimicking portfolios resembles that evinced in Table 7. The alphas 
are positive for all horizons, although statistically significant only for horizons of five to 12 
months.
20
  
9. Conclusion 
There is overwhelming evidence that the expectations hypothesis (EH) does not describe how 
long yields are determined in practice. In this paper, we explore the possibility that the EH 
fails because short yield expectations are subject to behavioral biases. To explore this idea, 
we test the specific biases that have been invoked to explain the stylized features of short-
                                                        
19
 Strategy B produces alphas ranging between 2.5% and 3.5% per annum in most cases.  
20
 Again, Strategy B generates much larger alphas (between 0.9% and 1.5% per annum) and 
strongly significant across all horizons. 
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term momentum and long-term return reversals in equity returns. We focus on the LSN and 
the conservatism biases and derive the testable implications of these biases for expectations 
in the bond market. In contrast with the equity market, where the markets’ expectations of 
earnings at specific dates cannot be inferred directly from stock prices, investor’s 
expectations of the short yield can be inferred from the term structure of interest rates. The 
bond market therefore offers a valuable opportunity to directly test the implications of 
behavioral biases for expectation errors.  
We find evidence for both of these biases, both in the full sample from 1952 to 2012 and in 
shorter, more recent samples following the structural break in bond yields in 1981, and 
following the financial crisis of 2007. Widely accepted proxies for the time-varying risk 
premium do have explanatory power in our model but they do not alter the verdict on the 
presence of behavioral biases. It appears that investors have expectations that are subject to 
behavioral biases but they are also risk averse and the risk premium they require is time-
varying.  
We also show that the biases could have been profitably exploited. We find that trading 
strategies based on behavioral variables deliver higher Sharpe ratios than strategies based on 
widely used  proxies for a time varying risk premium. We also find positive alphas with 
respect to mimicking portfolios that are based on these risk proxies. 
There is still much work to be done in the ongoing debate between risk-based and behavioral 
interpretations of anomalies. One interesting direction that has recently received attention is 
to examine whether the scale of anomalies is reduced where there is evidence of participation 
by more sophisticated investors. For example, are anomalies stronger in less developed 
markets or when risk capital mobility is lower, assuming mobile capital is in the hands of 
more sophisticated investors? Potì and Siddique (2013) study the impact of risk capital 
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mobility on anomalies and Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) examine whether technical trading 
rules are more successful for developing market currencies. It would be an interesting 
direction for future work to develop these ideas in the context of the bond market and ask 
whether evidence for the behavioral models systematically varies across markets that are 
differentiated by similar characteristics. 
Identifying that the failure of the EH is due to behavioral biases implies excess volatility in 
bond returns relative to the volatility of the short yield. Since such excess volatility can have 
real welfare costs, it is of interest to policy makers to consider how this volatility might be 
damped. The role of expectation errors that we identify suggests an important role for 
managing expectations so that these errors are minimized. If “forward guidance” by central 
banks reduces expectation errors then it will serve to reduce the importance of this source of 
excess volatility in returns. Once sufficient data has accumulated from regimes where 
“forward guidance” has been active, it will be interesting to consider its impact on 
expectation errors and the attendant behavioral biases. 
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Table 1 Momentum and Return Reversals 
   m 
n  1  2  3  6  9  12  24  36  48  60 
2  0.279**  ‐  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(4.016)  ‐  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
3  0.186**  0.172**  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(2.100)  (2.167)  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
6  0.191**  0.080  0.041  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(2.497)  (0.842)  (0.312)  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
9  0.174**  0.017  ‐0.043  ‐0.006 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(2.683)  (0.161)  (‐0.321)  (‐0.060) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
12  0.180**  0.023  ‐0.033  0.003 0.175** ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(3.027)  (0.207)  (‐0.245)  (0.034) (2.934) ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
24  0.155**  ‐0.017  ‐0.061  ‐0.005 0.132 0.079 ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
(3.388)  (‐0.173)  (‐0.526)  (‐0.064) (2.017) (0.779) ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐
36  0.123  ‐0.022  ‐0.064  ‐0.007 0.095 0.025 ‐0.201** ‐  ‐ ‐
(2.676)  (‐0.256)  (‐0.626)  (‐0.101) (1.415) (0.239) (‐2.171) ‐  ‐ ‐
48  0.107**  ‐0.035  ‐0.064  ‐0.011 0.064 ‐0.020 ‐0.204** ‐0.369**  ‐ ‐
(2.502)  (‐0.456)  (‐0.694)  (‐0.159) (0.910) (‐0.180) (‐2.279) (‐3.569)  ‐ ‐
60  0.095**  ‐0.040  ‐0.053  ‐0.011 0.043 ‐0.052 ‐0.207** ‐0.329**  ‐0.388** ‐
(2.280)  (‐0.569)  (‐0.625)  (‐0.156) (0.565) (‐0.460) (‐2.297) (‐2.938)  (‐5.741) ‐
120  0.069  ‐0.055  ‐0.043  ‐0.015 ‐0.007 ‐0.135 ‐0.203** ‐0.237**  ‐0.304** ‐0.351**
(1.583)  (‐0.925)  (‐0.621)  (‐0.200) (‐0.079) (‐1.039) (‐1.981) (‐2.042)  (‐5.113) (‐7.828)
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (8) in the main text. Results are reported for bond maturities n 
= 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48, 60 and 120 months, and holding periods m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48 and 60 months. The 
first number in each set is the estimate of the slope coefficient for the corresponding maturity (n) and horizon (m) 
combination. The constant term and the coefficient on the dummy are not reported. The figure in parentheses below each 
coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012. 
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Table 2 Short Term Predictions of the LSN 
m  Panel A: Full sample  Panel B: Post‐1981 sub‐sample  Panel C: Post‐2007 sub‐sample 
   ࢻ૛  ࢽ૛  ࢼ૛  ࡾഥ૛  ࢻ૛  ࢽ૛  ࢼ૛  ࡾഥ૛  ࢻ૛  ࢽ૛  ࢼ૛  ࡾഥ૛ 
1  ‐0.020**  0.000  0.280**  0.076  ‐0.015** ‐ 0.424** 0.178 ‐0.004*  ‐  0.478** 0.216
(‐6.092)  (0.142)  (4.000)  (‐6.418) ‐ (6.257) (‐1.766)  ‐  (3.410)
2  ‐0.032**  ‐0.002  0.174**  0.028  ‐0.024** ‐ 0.413** 0.170 ‐0.008**  ‐  0.294 0.085
(‐5.237)  (‐0.368)  (2.166)  (‐7.023) ‐ (5.920) (‐2.281)  ‐  (1.422)
3  ‐0.043**  ‐0.002  0.095  0.006  ‐0.028** ‐ 0.410** 0.172 ‐0.016**  ‐  0.249** 0.050
(‐4.438)  (‐0.223)  (0.728)  (‐5.895) ‐ (3.545) (‐2.002)  ‐  (2.254)
4  ‐0.055**  ‐0.004  0.006  ‐0.002  ‐0.035** ‐ 0.349** 0.143 ‐0.023*  ‐  0.256** 0.047
(‐4.543)  (‐0.302)  (0.041)  (‐5.437) ‐ (3.208) (‐1.806)  ‐  (2.698)
5  ‐0.060**  ‐0.010  ‐0.029  0.000  ‐0.046** ‐ 0.250** 0.081 ‐0.024*  ‐  0.301** 0.085
(‐4.558)  (‐0.726)  (‐0.226)  (‐5.368) ‐ (2.751) (‐1.846)  ‐  (3.129)
6  ‐0.056**  ‐0.021  0.001  0.006  ‐0.053** ‐ 0.210** 0.062 ‐0.026*  ‐  0.280** 0.097
(‐4.144)  (‐1.327)  (0.004)  (‐5.155) ‐ (2.366) (‐1.993)  ‐  (2.961)
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (9) in the main text. Results are reported for horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 months. Panel A reports results for the full sample, 01/1952–12/2012, Panel B for the post-1981 sub-sample, 01/1982–
12/2012, and Panel C for the post-2007 sub-sample, 01/2008–12/2012. The constant term and the coefficient on the dummy are not 
reported. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is the 
adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 Long Term Predictions of the LSN 
m  Panel A: Full sample  Panel B: Post‐1981 sub‐sample 
   ࢻ૛  ࢽ૛  ࢼ૛  ࡾഥ૛  ࢻ૛  ࢽ૛  ࢼ૛  ࡾഥ૛ 
9  ‐0.040**  ‐0.047**  0.146* 0.068 ‐0.071** ‐ 0.214**  0.060
(‐2.532)  (‐2.221)  (1.706) (‐4.134) ‐ (2.148) 
12  ‐0.039*  ‐0.073**  0.128 0.100 ‐0.087** ‐ 0.245**  0.069
(‐1.739)  (‐2.608)  (1.280) (‐3.479) ‐ (2.152) 
18  ‐0.042  ‐0.129**  ‐0.100 0.112 ‐0.142** ‐ 0.055  0.000
(‐1.285)  (‐3.117)  (‐0.796) (‐3.693) ‐ (0.427) 
24  ‐0.037  ‐0.195**  ‐0.245** 0.195 ‐0.208** ‐ ‐0.180**  0.031
(‐0.958)  (‐4.160)  (‐2.284) (‐6.706) ‐ (‐2.165) 
36  ‐0.023  ‐0.335**  ‐0.490** 0.434 ‐0.332** ‐ ‐0.495**  0.332
(‐0.603)  (‐5.874)  (‐5.486) (‐8.268) ‐ (‐4.655) 
48  ‐0.003  ‐0.409**  ‐0.523** 0.527 ‐0.337** ‐ ‐0.328**  0.151
(‐0.076)  (‐6.170)  (‐4.062) (‐12.559) ‐ (‐2.694) 
60  0.014  ‐0.451**  ‐0.444** 0.538 ‐0.303** ‐ ‐0.033  ‐0.003
(0.351)  (‐7.082)  (‐2.386) (‐6.051) ‐ (‐0.164) 
120  0.080  ‐0.633**  ‐0.304 0.578 ‐0.242** ‐ 0.427**  0.236
(0.918)  (‐6.452)  (‐1.553) (‐2.551) ‐ (3.179) 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (9) in the main text. Results are reported for 
horizons m = 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60 and 120 months. Panel A reports results for the full sample, 
01/1952–12/2012 and Panel B for the post-1981 sub-sample, 01/1982–12/2012. The figure in parentheses 
below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-
squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Table 4 Predictions of the Conservatism Bias 
i  Panel A: Full sample  Panel B: Post‐1981 sub‐sample  Panel C: Post‐2007 sub‐sample 
ࢻ૜  ࢽ૜  ࢼ૜  ࡾഥ૛  ࢻ૜  ࢽ૜  ࢼ૜  ࡾഥ૛  ࢻ૜  ࢽ૜  ࢼ૜  ࡾഥ૛ 
1  ‐0.010**  ‐0.003  0.121 0.013  ‐0.011** ‐ 0.259** 0.065 ‐0.003**  ‐  0.585** 0.345
(‐3.454)  (‐0.855)  (1.323) (‐5.324) ‐ (2.110) (‐2.403)  ‐  (4.803)
2  ‐0.007**  0.000  0.171** 0.027  ‐0.006** ‐ 0.274** 0.073 ‐0.003**  ‐  0.524** 0.270
(‐2.669)  (‐0.056)  (2.006) (‐3.433) ‐ (2.751) (‐2.431)  ‐  (5.543)
3  ‐0.006**  ‐0.001  0.173** 0.027  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.110 0.009 ‐0.004**  ‐  0.466** 0.208
(‐2.837)  (‐0.305)  (2.315) (‐4.496) ‐ (1.569) (‐2.246)  ‐  (4.126)
4  ‐0.002  ‐0.006**  0.129** 0.019  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.114* 0.010 ‐0.005**  ‐  0.451** 0.193
(‐1.030)  (‐2.071)  (2.171) (‐4.540) ‐ (1.760) (‐2.162)  ‐  (3.818)
5  0.002  ‐0.010**  0.098* 0.021  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.090 0.005 ‐0.005**  ‐  0.347** 0.109
(0.994)  (‐3.577)  (1.922) (‐4.510) ‐ (1.568) (‐2.103)  ‐  (2.854)
6  0.004*  ‐0.012**  0.102** 0.029  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.115** 0.011 ‐0.005**  ‐  0.159* 0.010
(1.703)  (‐3.900)  (2.017) (‐4.232) ‐ (2.209) (‐2.206)  ‐  (1.906)
7  0.004*  ‐0.012**  0.121** 0.036  ‐0.007** ‐ 0.200** 0.038 ‐0.004*  ‐  0.028 ‐0.017
(1.681)  (‐3.708)  (2.703) (‐3.968) ‐ (3.230) (‐1.971)  ‐  (0.311)
8  0.004  ‐0.012**  0.128** 0.040  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.224** 0.048 ‐0.003  ‐  ‐0.009 ‐0.018
(1.481)  (‐3.716)  (2.993) (‐4.286) ‐ (2.743) (‐1.303)  ‐  (‐0.073)
9  0.003  ‐0.012**  0.108** 0.033  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.160** 0.023 ‐0.002  ‐  ‐0.052 ‐0.015
(1.281)  (‐3.678)  (2.607) (‐4.340) ‐ (1.972) (‐0.922)  ‐  (‐0.340)
10  0.002  ‐0.011**  0.095** 0.028  ‐0.009** ‐ 0.108 0.009 ‐0.003  ‐  ‐0.120 ‐0.002
(0.982)  (‐3.679)  (2.515) (‐4.365) ‐ (1.569) (‐1.096)  ‐  (‐0.829)
11  0.001  ‐0.010**  0.094** 0.024  ‐0.009** ‐ 0.097* 0.007 ‐0.004  ‐  ‐0.146 0.006
(0.738)  (‐3.609)  (2.849) (‐4.246) ‐ (1.764) (‐1.488)  ‐  (‐1.122)
12  0.001  ‐0.009**  0.090** 0.020  ‐0.008** ‐ 0.097** 0.007 ‐0.005*  ‐  ‐0.128 0.000
(0.646)  (‐3.341)  (2.813) (‐3.914) ‐ (2.075) (‐1.904)  ‐  (‐1.007)
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (10) in the main text. Results are reported for horizons i = 1 to 12 months and 
lag m = 1 month. Panel A reports results for the full sample, 01/1952–12/2012, Panel B for the post-1981 sub-sample, 01/1982–12/2012, 
and Panel C for the post-2007 sub-sample, 01/2008–12/2012. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and 
West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Short Term Predictions of the LSN after Controlling for Risk  
࢓  Intercept  ࡰ  ࡲࡱ  ࢌ࡯ࡼ૚   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૛   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૜   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૝   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૞   ࣊  ࢍࢇ࢖  ࢍ  ∆ࢁ  ࢂ࢕࢒  ࡾഥ૛ 
Panel A: Cochrane‐Piazzessi forward rates (CP) as risk factors 
1  ‐0.003  ‐0.004  0.229**  ‐0.009*  0.005  0.001  ‐0.005  0.004  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.150 
(‐0.665)  (‐1.033)  (3.514)  (‐1.910)  (0.575)  (0.119)  (‐0.470)  (0.640)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  ‐0.002  ‐0.008  0.136**  ‐0.010  0.003  0.001  ‐0.014  0.014  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.129 
(‐0.188)  (‐1.099)  (1.997)  (‐1.278)  (0.184)  (0.031)  (‐0.649)  (1.231)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
3  ‐0.005  ‐0.008  0.064  ‐0.003  ‐0.012  0.005  ‐0.013  0.017  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.116 
(‐0.317)  (‐0.733)  (0.537)  (‐0.295)  (‐0.467)  (0.115)  (‐0.403)  (1.052)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
6  ‐0.001  ‐0.031*  ‐0.015  ‐0.002  ‐0.011  ‐0.025  0.012  0.016  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.132 
(‐0.026)  (‐1.658)  (‐0.121)  (‐0.108)  (‐0.285)  (‐0.491)  (0.263)  (0.620)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables (Macro) as risk factors 
1  ‐0.007*  0.006  0.218**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.015*  0.018  0.005**  0.009  ‐0.640**  0.121 
(‐1.619)  (1.396)  (3.006)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐1.999)  (0.772)  (2.138)  (0.866)  (‐2.788) 
2  ‐0.013  0.004  0.105  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.029**  0.071*  0.006  ‐0.009  ‐0.826  0.083 
(‐1.364)  (0.482)  (1.156)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐2.221)  (1.809)  (1.491)  (‐0.757)  (‐1.423) 
3  ‐0.019  0.005  0.021  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.037**  0.098*  0.005  ‐0.026*  ‐0.970  0.065 
(‐1.238)  (0.391)  (0.153)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐2.103)  (1.738)  (1.146)  (‐1.778)  (‐1.070) 
6  ‐0.030  ‐0.009  ‐0.084  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.020  0.109  0.006  ‐0.044**  ‐1.536  0.052 
(‐1.264)  (‐0.404)  (‐0.690)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐0.823)  (1.064)  (1.014)  (‐2.221)  (‐1.016) 
Panel C: Both Cochrane‐Piazzessi forward rates and macroeconomic variables (CP+Macro) as risk factors 
1  ‐0.010**  ‐0.002  0.199**  ‐0.012**  0.004  0.002  ‐0.011  0.015**  0.001  0.091**  0.005**  0.006  ‐0.521*  0.176 
(‐2.056)  (‐0.345)  (3.030)  (‐2.267)  (0.469)  (0.160)  (‐0.976)  (2.138)  (0.088)  (3.060)  (2.006)  (0.582)  (‐1.708) 
2  ‐0.014  ‐0.007  0.096  ‐0.012  0.001  0.001  ‐0.022  0.029**  ‐0.003  0.170**  0.005  ‐0.015  ‐0.429  0.159 
(‐1.453)  (‐0.754)  (1.272)  (‐1.597)  (0.058)  (0.027)  (‐0.965)  (2.293)  (‐0.220)  (3.133)  (1.486)  (‐1.417)  (‐0.621) 
3  ‐0.019  ‐0.009  0.009  ‐0.004  ‐0.017  0.003  ‐0.019  0.032*  ‐0.007  0.193**  0.006  ‐0.036**  ‐0.304  0.147 
(‐1.323)  (‐0.584)  (0.071)  (‐0.325)  (‐0.626)  (0.070)  (‐0.552)  (1.817)  (‐0.490)  (2.455)  (1.332)  (‐2.567)  (‐0.294) 
6  ‐0.018  ‐0.029  ‐0.091  ‐0.006  ‐0.012  ‐0.024  0.001  0.030  0.027  0.229*  0.008  ‐0.061**  ‐0.076  0.166 
(‐0.811)  (‐1.264)  (‐0.721)  (‐0.298)  (‐0.292)  (‐0.493)  (0.020)  (1.093)  (1.143)  (1.935)  (1.218)  (‐3.276)  (‐0.047) 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (11) in the main text. Results are reported for horizons m = 1, 2, 3 and 6 
months. Panel A reports results for the specification including the five CP forward rates only ( ஼݂௉ଵ , ஼݂௉ଶ , ஼݂௉ଷ , ஼݂௉ସ , ஼݂௉ହ ). Panel B reports 
results for the specification including the macro variables only: the inflation rate (ߨ), a measure of output gap (݃ܽ݌ሻ, a measure of 
economic growth (݃), the change in the unemployment rate (Δܷ), and a measure of bond market volatility (ܸ݋݈ሻ. Panel C reports results 
for the specification including both the CP forward rates and the macro variables. D is a dummy variable that is set to one after December 
1981 and zero otherwise. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ 
is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 
12/2012.  
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Table 6 Long Term Predictions of the LSN after Controlling for Risk
࢓  Intercept  ࡰ  ࡲࡱ  ࢌ࡯ࡼ૚   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૛   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૜   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૝   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૞   ࣊  ࢍࢇ࢖  ࢍ  ∆ࢁ  ࢂ࢕࢒  ࡾഥ૛ 
Panel A: Cochrane‐Piazzessi forward rates (CP) as risk factors 
18  0.077  ‐0.109**  ‐0.218*  0.053  0.005  ‐0.095  ‐0.095  0.112*  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.274 
(1.630)  (‐2.473)  (‐1.731)  (1.364)  (0.114)  (‐1.448)  (‐1.270)  (1.763)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
24  0.087*  ‐0.173**  ‐0.464**  0.075  0.061  ‐0.217**  ‐0.056  0.119  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.365 
(1.671)  (‐3.399)  (‐3.101)  (1.629)  (1.148)  (‐2.847)  (‐0.707)  (1.403)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
36  0.068  ‐0.315**  ‐0.493**  0.033  0.002  ‐0.083  ‐0.028  0.061  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.484 
(0.998)  (‐4.639)  (‐2.895)  (0.773)  (0.029)  (‐1.448)  (‐0.519)  (0.945)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
48  0.081  ‐0.379**  ‐0.346**  ‐0.006  ‐0.050  0.019  0.006  0.016  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.563 
(1.247)  (‐5.041)  (‐2.192)  (‐0.181)  (‐0.915)  (0.341)  (0.135)  (0.289)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
60  0.119*  ‐0.407**  ‐0.298  0.010  ‐0.079  0.058  0.030  ‐0.037  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.575 
(1.702)  (‐4.815)  (‐1.556)  (0.296)  (‐1.171)  (0.835)  (0.330)  (‐0.489)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables (Macro) as risk factors 
18  ‐0.018  ‐0.107**  ‐0.208**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.025  0.427  0.008  ‐0.034  ‐2.490  0.168 
(‐0.584)  (‐2.534)  (‐2.042)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (0.391)  (1.467)  (1.338)  (‐0.793)  (‐1.267) 
24  ‐0.013  ‐0.171**  ‐0.354**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.041  0.515  0.003  ‐0.034  ‐2.716*  0.254 
(‐0.408)  (‐3.799)  (‐3.393)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (0.503)  (1.603)  (0.328)  (‐0.654)  (‐1.660) 
36  ‐0.013  ‐0.319**  ‐0.546**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.023  0.490  0.000  ‐0.017  ‐1.531  0.465 
(‐0.329)  (‐6.472)  (‐4.632)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (0.283)  (1.595)  (0.018)  (‐0.337)  (‐0.959) 
48  0.039  ‐0.380**  ‐0.531**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.016  0.281  0.001  0.034  ‐2.913**  0.555 
(1.041)  (‐6.318)  (‐4.468)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (0.359)  (1.024)  (0.207)  (0.864)  (‐2.933) 
60  0.125**  ‐0.368**  ‐0.385**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.064  0.112  ‐0.009  0.025  ‐7.335**  0.642 
(3.573)  (‐6.257)  (‐3.094)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (1.052)  (0.538)  (‐0.946)  (0.700)  (‐7.055) 
Panel C: Both Cochrane‐Piazzesi forward rates and macroeconomic variables (CP+Macro) as risk factors 
18  0.050  ‐0.103**  ‐0.275**  0.037  0.018  ‐0.083  ‐0.130**  0.135**  0.099**  0.359  0.012*  ‐0.084**  0.252  0.326 
(1.223)  (‐2.537)  (‐2.400)  (1.032)  (0.389)  (‐1.286)  (‐1.992)  (2.445)  (2.191)  (1.475)  (1.915)  (‐2.406)  (0.124) 
24  0.057  ‐0.164**  ‐0.485**  0.051  0.077  ‐0.203**  ‐0.099  0.153*  0.099*  0.409  0.004  ‐0.080*  ‐0.401  0.406 
(1.158)  (‐3.684)  (‐3.355)  (1.201)  (1.447)  (‐2.755)  (‐1.374)  (1.803)  (1.993)  (1.451)  (0.599)  (‐1.772)  (‐0.175) 
36  0.038  ‐0.306**  ‐0.460**  0.004  0.020  ‐0.070  ‐0.060  0.089  0.070  0.403  0.003  ‐0.059*  0.091  0.505 
(0.529)  (‐5.649)  (‐3.027)  (0.106)  (0.297)  (‐1.279)  (‐0.817)  (0.969)  (1.342)  (1.175)  (0.488)  (‐1.707)  (0.029) 
48  0.052  ‐0.360**  ‐0.325**  ‐0.032  ‐0.035  0.034  ‐0.030  0.053  0.068*  0.315  0.003  0.012  ‐2.428  0.581 
(0.817)  (‐5.483)  (‐2.276)  (‐0.852)  (‐0.645)  (0.724)  (‐0.518)  (0.753)  (1.819)  (0.909)  (0.463)  (0.371)  (‐1.037) 
60  0.084*  ‐0.365**  ‐0.276**  ‐0.026  ‐0.066  0.086  ‐0.011  0.023  0.078  0.293  ‐0.010  0.026  ‐8.688**  0.664 
(1.695)  (‐6.187)  (‐2.446)  (‐0.918)  (‐1.264)  (1.427)  (‐0.130)  (0.395)  (1.598)  (1.260)  (‐1.033)  (0.954)  (‐5.654) 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (11) in the main text. Results are reported for horizons m = 18, 24, 36, 48 and 60 
months. Panel A reports results for the specification including the five CP forward rates only ( ஼݂௉ଵ , ஼݂௉ଶ , ஼݂௉ଷ , ஼݂௉ସ , ஼݂௉ହ ). Panel B reports results 
for the specification including the macro variables only: the inflation rate (ߨ), a measure of output gap (݃ܽ݌ሻ, a measure of economic growth 
(݃), the change in the unemployment rate (Δܷ), and a measure of bond market volatility (ܸ݋݈ሻ. Panel C reports results for the specification 
including both the CP forward rates and the macro variables. D is a dummy variable that is set to one after December 1981 and zero 
otherwise. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-
squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012.  
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Table 7 Predictions of the Conservatism Bias after Controlling for Risk 
࢏  Intercept  ࡰ  ࡱࡾ  ࢌ࡯ࡼ૚   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૛   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૜   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૝   ࢌ࡯ࡼ૞   ࣊  ࢍࢇ࢖  ࢍ  ∆ࢁ  ࢂ࢕࢒  ࡾഥ૛ 
Panel A: Cochrane‐Piazzesi forward rates (CP) as risk factors 
1  0.004  ‐0.003  0.107  ‐0.004  0.012  ‐0.015  0.004  0.001  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.033 
(0.619)  (‐0.593)  (1.208)  (‐0.728)  (1.012)  (‐0.869)  (0.306)  (0.086)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  0.001  ‐0.001  0.170*  ‐0.004  0.010  ‐0.014  0.005  0.001  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.035 
(0.214)  (‐0.227)  (1.906)  (‐0.635)  (0.912)  (‐0.826)  (0.358)  (0.117)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
3  0.000  ‐0.004  0.182**  ‐0.006  0.006  ‐0.008  0.005  0.000  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.041 
(‐0.023)  (‐0.986)  (2.234)  (‐0.998)  (0.703)  (‐0.521)  (0.368)  (0.056)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
6  0.005  ‐0.014**  0.104**  ‐0.001  0.003  ‐0.009  0.004  0.002  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.025 
(1.021)  (‐3.205)  (2.017)  (‐0.138)  (0.350)  (‐0.839)  (0.368)  (0.254)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
9  0.005  ‐0.012**  0.098**  0.007**  ‐0.009  ‐0.009  0.009  0.002  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.043 
(1.180)  (‐3.117)  (2.276)  (2.180)  (‐1.292)  (‐0.898)  (1.032)  (0.298)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
12  0.002  ‐0.009**  0.103**  0.011**  ‐0.025**  0.009  0.004  0.000  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.042 
(0.677)  (‐2.576)  (2.760)  (4.157)  (‐3.752)  (0.964)  (0.400)  (0.047)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Panel B: Macroeconomic variables (Macro) as risk factors  
1  ‐0.008  0.000  0.089  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.005  0.057**  0.006**  ‐0.001  ‐0.180  0.031 
(‐1.312)  (0.068)  (0.968)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐0.724)  (2.699)  (2.026)  (‐0.165)  (‐0.519) 
2  ‐0.006  0.002  0.141*  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.002  0.023  0.004  ‐0.010  ‐0.105  0.035 
(‐1.067)  (0.323)  (1.870)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐0.279)  (1.184)  (1.524)  (‐1.210)  (‐0.265) 
3  ‐0.003  0.000  0.142*  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.004  ‐0.004  0.003  ‐0.014*  ‐0.174  0.036 
(‐0.626)  (0.065)  (1.903)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (‐0.482)  (‐0.215)  (1.314)  (‐1.649)  (‐0.517) 
6  0.000  ‐0.011**  0.063*  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.008  0.043**  0.004*  ‐0.014  0.018  0.041 
(‐0.089)  (‐2.717)  (1.644)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (1.183)  (2.140)  (1.852)  (‐1.489)  (0.071) 
9  0.002  ‐0.010**  0.081**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.006  0.045**  0.001  ‐0.013*  ‐0.111  0.040 
(0.693)  (‐2.330)  (2.037)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (1.027)  (2.149)  (0.409)  (‐1.655)  (‐0.423) 
12  0.003  ‐0.007**  0.076**  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.001  0.033*  0.000  ‐0.009  ‐0.117  0.020 
(1.036)  (‐2.222)  (2.292)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  (0.208)  (1.770)  (‐0.142)  (‐1.047)  (‐0.623) 
Panel C: Both Cochrane‐Piazzesi forward rates and macroeconomic variables (CP+Macro) as risk factors 
1  ‐0.003  ‐0.003  0.083  ‐0.006  0.012  ‐0.014  0.002  0.004  0.006  0.081**  0.005*  ‐0.004  0.144  0.049 
(‐0.542)  (‐0.471)  (0.931)  (‐0.922)  (0.946)  (‐0.798)  (0.113)  (0.499)  (0.741)  (2.390)  (1.946)  (‐0.443)  (0.364) 
2  ‐0.003  ‐0.001  0.144*  ‐0.005  0.009  ‐0.012  0.003  0.002  0.006  0.042  0.004  ‐0.011  0.134  0.043 
(‐0.562)  (‐0.147)  (1.946)  (‐0.636)  (0.766)  (‐0.736)  (0.230)  (0.300)  (0.918)  (1.279)  (1.393)  (‐1.333)  (0.294) 
3  ‐0.003  ‐0.004  0.156*  ‐0.006  0.004  ‐0.006  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.031  0.003  ‐0.014  ‐0.031  0.046 
(‐0.705)  (‐0.686)  (1.853)  (‐0.925)  (0.496)  (‐0.422)  (0.202)  (0.426)  (0.473)  (0.983)  (1.112)  (‐1.621)  (‐0.075) 
6  0.000  ‐0.013**  0.074*  ‐0.004  0.004  ‐0.007  0.000  0.005  0.013*  0.066**  0.004*  ‐0.015  0.128  0.043 
(‐0.011)  (‐2.774)  (1.813)  (‐0.688)  (0.451)  (‐0.648)  (‐0.035)  (0.599)  (1.722)  (2.419)  (1.824)  (‐1.516)  (0.430) 
9  0.002  ‐0.012**  0.079**  0.005  ‐0.009  ‐0.007  0.005  0.005  0.006  0.052**  0.001  ‐0.015*  0.026  0.051 
(0.444)  (‐2.784)  (2.453)  (1.402)  (‐1.194)  (‐0.819)  (0.664)  (0.735)  (1.120)  (2.105)  (0.769)  (‐1.902)  (0.097) 
12  0.001  ‐0.009**  0.093**  0.011**  ‐0.026**  0.009  0.003  0.002  ‐0.001  0.025  0.001  ‐0.011  ‐0.017  0.041 
(0.203)  (‐2.592)  (2.443)  (3.719)  (‐3.818)  (1.080)  (0.275)  (0.334)  (‐0.219)  (1.032)  (0.515)  (‐1.228)  (‐0.076) 
Notes: The table reports the results of estimating regression (12) in the main text. Results are reported for horizons i = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12 
months and lag m = 1 month. Panel A reports results for the specification including the five CP forward rates only ( ஼݂௉ଵ , ஼݂௉ଶ , ஼݂௉ଷ , ஼݂௉ସ , ஼݂௉ହ ). 
Panel B reports results for the specification including the macro variables only: the inflation rate (ߨ), a measure of output gap (݃ܽ݌ሻ, a 
measure of economic growth (݃), the change in the unemployment rate (Δܷ), and a measure of bond market volatility (ܸ݋݈ሻ. Panel C 
reports results for the specification including both the CP forward rates and the macro variables. D is a dummy variable that is set to one 
after December 1981 and zero otherwise. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected 
t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 
01/1952 to 12/2012.  
  
  
 
Table 8 Out of sample Forecast Encompassing Tests Results: Short Run LSN  
Panel A: FE vs. CP  Panel B: FE vs. Macro  Panel C: FE vs. CP+Macro 
m  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓࡯ࡼ   ࡾഥ૛  ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕ ࡾഥ૛  ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓࡯ࡼାࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕ ࡾഥ૛ ENC‐NEW 
1  0.000  0.494**  0.410**  0.049  27.16  ‐0.001  0.460**  0.408**  0.050  15.44  0.001  0.493**  0.475**  0.076  14.79 
(‐0.034)  (2.404)  (2.682)  (‐0.210)  (1.976)  (2.070)     (0.103)  (2.284)  (3.147) 
2  ‐0.014*  0.237  0.320**  0.035  12.23  ‐0.018**  0.184  0.295  0.027  ‐3.36  ‐0.014*  0.261  0.321*  0.044  ‐0.77 
(‐1.694)  (1.122)  (2.081)  (‐2.016)  (0.670)  (1.019)     (‐1.803)  (1.260)  (1.757) 
3  ‐0.031**  0.130  0.194  0.018  2.69  ‐0.033**  0.061  0.224  0.015  ‐11.15  ‐0.032**  0.136  0.189  0.021  ‐10.53 
(‐2.727)  (0.640)  (1.413)  (‐2.891)  (0.166)  (0.552)     (‐2.922)  (0.643)  (1.001) 
4  ‐0.036**  0.095  0.218*  0.022  ‐4.72  ‐0.040**  0.077  0.172  0.013  ‐7.14  ‐0.038**  0.103  0.196  0.025  ‐10.27 
(‐2.564)  (0.469)  (1.990)  (‐2.715)  (0.212)  (0.422)     (‐2.742)  (0.489)  (1.075) 
5  ‐0.046**  0.040  0.198  0.014  ‐10.24  ‐0.051**  0.084  0.078  0.004  ‐0.76  ‐0.046**  0.045  0.204  0.022  ‐7.24 
(‐3.160)  (0.229)  (1.568)  (‐3.340)  (0.244)  (0.190)     (‐3.320)  (0.241)  (1.051) 
6  ‐0.053**  0.002  0.180  0.010  ‐11.22  ‐0.059**  0.099  0.001  0.000  ‐0.96  ‐0.053**  0.021  0.172  0.015  ‐8.16 
(‐3.313)  (0.012)  (1.322)  (‐3.600)  (0.297)  (0.002)     (‐3.464)  (0.114)  (0.873) 
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecast encompassing tests. Results are reported for horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 months. Panel A reports results of 
forecast comparisons when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, Panel B when only the macro variables are used, and Panel C when both the CP forward rates and 
the macro variables are used. The first four columns of each panel reports the results of estimating the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (13) in the main text. The test compares the 
out-of-sample forecasts of  forecast errors based on the estimation of equation (9), ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ிா , with those based on the estimation of equation (11) including only the risk factors, 
ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞. ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܨܧ෢௧ା௠஼௉  when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ெ௔௖௥௢ when only the macro variables are used and ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܨܧ෢௧ା௠஼௉ାெ௔௖௥௢ when 
both the CP forward rates and the macro variables are used. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is 
the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The column labeled "ENC-NEW" reports the encompassing test statistic of Clark 
and McCraken (2001). The test compares out-of-sample forecasts from an unrestricted specification of equation (11) in the main text that includes both ܨܧ and risk factors, to 
those based on a restricted model that includes only the risk factors. ENC-NEW statistics that are statistically significant at the 5% level on the basis of bootstrapped critical 
values provided in Clark and McCraken (2001, 2005) are in bold. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012. 
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Table 9 Out of sample Forecast Encompassing Tests Results: Long Run LSN  
Panel A: FE vs. CP  Panel B: FE vs. Macro  Panel C: FE vs. CP+Macro 
m  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓࡯ࡼ   ࡾഥ૛  ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕ ࡾഥ૛  ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓ࡲࡱ ࡲࡱ෢ ࢚ା࢓࡯ࡼାࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕ ࡾഥ૛ ENC‐NEW 
9  ‐0.051** 0.202 0.030  0.019 9.19 ‐0.062** 0.546* ‐0.395 0.041  ‐8.42 ‐0.051** 0.207 0.033 0.019 3.96 
(‐2.211) (1.169) (0.265)  (‐2.649) (1.861) (‐1.246) (‐2.312) (1.079) (0.184)
12  ‐0.047 0.231 0.123  0.044 ‐0.34 ‐0.062* 0.522* ‐0.299 0.053  ‐14.21 ‐0.047 0.295 0.047 0.039 ‐11.65 
(‐1.375) (1.116) (1.241)  (‐1.740) (1.981) (‐1.059) (‐1.419) (1.397) (0.321)
18  ‐0.040 0.331 0.141  0.058 15.43 ‐0.058 0.490* ‐0.199 0.055  2.82 ‐0.038 0.384* 0.073 0.053 15.57 
(‐0.948) (1.411) (1.099)  (‐1.254) (2.202) (‐0.936) (‐1.001) (1.689) (0.506)
24  ‐0.046 0.355* 0.093  0.065 37.07 ‐0.074 0.515** ‐0.301 0.071  54.24 ‐0.047 0.395* 0.018 0.062 38.88 
(‐0.973) (1.742) (0.596)  (‐1.376) (2.058) (‐0.743) (‐1.041) (1.926) (0.107)
36  ‐0.036 0.774** ‐0.338**  0.165 18.66 ‐0.072 0.603 ‐0.252 0.135  120.79 ‐0.043 0.817** ‐0.469** 0.187 11.71 
(‐0.360) (2.212) (‐2.728)  (‐0.742) (1.546) (‐1.008) (‐0.446) (2.596) (‐2.780)
48  ‐0.084 0.693** ‐0.311  0.151 33.47 ‐0.090 0.420** 0.006 0.099  124.92 ‐0.094 0.620** ‐0.295 0.136 16.40 
(‐0.905) (2.079) (‐0.909)  (‐0.625) (2.024) (0.015) (‐0.976) (2.496) (‐0.810)
60  ‐0.161 0.363 ‐0.123  0.062 49.55 ‐0.012 0.076 0.924** 0.237  39.08 ‐0.166 0.311 ‐0.080 0.057 28.84 
(‐1.588) (1.026) (‐0.344)  (‐0.094) (0.560) (3.021) (‐1.376) (1.346) (‐0.280)
120  ‐0.414** 0.165 ‐0.265**  0.279 8.15 ‐0.429** 0.044 ‐0.128 0.054  ‐24.38 ‐0.390** 0.094 ‐0.168** 0.180 5.13 
(15.02) (1.016) (‐2.703)  (‐18.30) (0.249) (‐0.753) (‐10.15) (0.649) (‐2.217)
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecast encompassing tests. Results are reported for horizons m = 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 60 and 120 months. Panel A 
reports results of forecast comparisons when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, Panel B when only the macro variables are used, and Panel C when both the CP 
forward rates and the macro variables are used. The first four columns of each panel reports the results of estimating the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (13) in the main text. The 
test compares the out-of-sample forecasts of  forecast errors based on the estimation of equation (9), ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ிா , with those based on the estimation of equation (11) including only the 
risk factors, ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞. ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܨܧ෢௧ା௠஼௉  when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ெ௔௖௥௢ when only the macro variables are used and ܨܧ෢௧ା௠ோ௜௦௞ ൌ
ܨܧ෢௧ା௠஼௉ାெ௔௖௥௢ when both the CP forward rates and the macro variables are used. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected 
t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The column labeled "ENC-NEW" reports the encompassing test 
statistic of Clark and McCraken (2001). The test compares out-of-sample forecasts from an unrestricted specification of equation (11) in the main text that includes both ܨܧ and 
risk factors, to those based on a restricted model that includes only the risk factors. ENC-NEW statistics that are statistically significant at the 5% level on the basis of 
bootstrapped critical values provided in Clark and McCraken (2001, 2005) are in bold. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012.  
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Table 10 Out of sample Forecast Encompassing Tests Results: Conservatism Bias 
Panel A: FE vs. CP  Panel B: FE vs. Macro  Panel C: FE vs. CP+Macro 
i  Intercept  ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏ࡱࡾ   ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏࡯ࡼ   ࡾഥ૛ ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏ࡱࡾ   ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏ࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕  ࡾഥ૛ ENC‐NEW  Intercept  ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏ࡱࡾ   ࡱࡾ෢ ࢚ା࢓,࢏࡯ࡼାࡹࢇࢉ࢘࢕  ࡾഥ૛ ENC‐NEW 
1  ‐0.006 0.290  0.087  0.010 0.45 ‐0.006 0.082 0.336 0.014 ‐3.98 ‐0.007 0.235 0.164 0.013  ‐2.87 
(‐1.461) (1.111)  (0.446)  (‐1.348) (0.263) (1.259) (‐1.544) (0.945) (0.907)
2  ‐0.004 0.487*  ‐0.083  0.013 11.03 ‐0.003 0.329 0.129 0.013 2.90 ‐0.003 0.392 0.056 0.013  4.55 
(‐1.260) (1.699)  (‐0.455)  (‐1.050) (0.827) (0.397) (‐1.131) (1.359) (0.320)
3  ‐0.007** 0.418  ‐0.232  0.008 19.78 ‐0.005 0.372 0.037 0.005 6.80 ‐0.005* 0.387 0.011 0.005  12.06 
(‐2.313) (1.636)  (‐1.297)  (‐1.624) (1.120) (0.113) (‐1.728) (1.495) (0.056)
4  ‐0.007** 0.316  ‐0.635**  0.012 8.54 ‐0.005* 0.163 ‐0.049 ‐0.002 ‐0.73 ‐0.005* 0.190 ‐0.169 0.000  4.15 
(‐2.588) (1.266)  (‐2.149)  (‐1.993) (0.554) (‐0.160) (‐2.140) (0.753) (‐0.903)
5  ‐0.001 0.592*  ‐0.348  0.006 3.07 ‐0.001 0.232 0.178 0.001 ‐3.64 ‐0.001 0.450* ‐0.174 0.003  0.32 
(‐0.578) (1.945)  (‐1.179)  (‐0.380) (0.743) (0.468) (‐0.457) (1.683) (‐0.619)
6  0.002 0.742**  ‐0.163  0.016 3.71 0.002 0.414 0.260 0.016 ‐1.11 0.002 0.698** ‐0.125 0.015  1.10 
(0.779) (2.181)  (‐0.603)  (1.063) (1.027) (0.618) (0.750) (2.058) (‐0.423)
7  0.003 0.797**  ‐0.093  0.031 3.93 0.003* 0.581 0.167 0.031 0.76 0.003 0.782** ‐0.083 0.031  1.78 
(1.452) (2.803)  (‐0.416)  (1.731) (1.582) (0.459) (1.353) (2.744) (‐0.357)
8  0.003 0.723**  0.018  0.039 4.68 0.003* 0.675** 0.080 0.039 1.87 0.003 0.748** ‐0.012 0.039  2.55 
(1.498) (3.084)  (0.107)  (1.725) (2.173) (0.264) (1.423) (3.171) (‐0.065)
9  0.002 0.589**  0.144  0.032 3.16 0.003 0.662** 0.054 0.031 1.99 0.002 0.650** 0.075 0.031  1.74 
(1.112) (2.805)  (1.074)  (1.261) (2.273) (0.183) (1.055) (3.080) (0.518)
10  0.001 0.488**  0.228*  0.025 2.92 0.001 0.651** ‐0.016 0.020 0.78 0.001 0.556** 0.146 0.022  1.86 
(0.548) (2.450)  (1.903)  (0.471) (2.378) (‐0.054) (0.473) (2.808) (1.158)
11  0.000 0.443**  0.277**  0.020 4.64 0.000 0.660** ‐0.122 0.012 0.28 0.000 0.503** 0.184 0.016  3.25 
(0.113) (2.283)  (2.352)  (‐0.224) (2.565) (‐0.418) (‐0.013) (2.608) (1.585)
12  0.000 0.390*  0.301**  0.015 5.26 ‐0.001 0.664** ‐0.259 0.006 0.42 ‐0.001 0.440** 0.192* 0.009  3.98 
(‐0.221) (1.794)  (2.697)  (‐0.674) (2.447) (‐0.860) (‐0.382) (2.048) (1.743)
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecast encompassing tests. Results are reported for horizons i = 1 to 12 months and lag m = 1 month. Panel A reports 
results of forecast comparisons when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, Panel B when only the macro variables are used, and Panel C when both the CP 
forward rates and the macro variables are used. The first four columns of each panel reports the results of estimating the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (14) in the main text. 
The test compares the out-of-sample forecasts of  forecast revisions based on the estimation of equation (10), ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ாோ , with those based on the estimation of equation (12) 
including only the risk factors, ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ோ௜௦௞ . ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜஼௉  when only the CP forward rates are used as risk factors, ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ெ௔௖௥௢ when only the macro variables are 
used and ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜ோ௜௦௞ ൌ ܧ෢ܴ ௧ା௠,௜஼௉ାெ௔௖௥௢ when both the CP forward rates and the macro variables are used. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey 
and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The column labeled "ENC-NEW" 
reports the encompassing test statistic of Clark and McCraken (2001). The test compares out-of-sample forecasts from an unrestricted specification of equation (12) in the 
main text that includes both ܧܴ and risk factors, to those based on a restricted model that includes only the risk factors. ENC-NEW statistics that are statistically significant at 
the 5% level on the basis of bootstrapped critical values provided in Clark and McCraken (2001, 2005) are in bold. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012. 
  
 
Table 11 Sharpe Ratios: Behavioral Strategy versus CP and CP+Macro Strategies 
Panel A: FE Strategy  Panel B: ER Strategy 
   Strategy A  Strategy B  Strategy A  Strategy B 
Strategy  m  SR  p‐value  SR  p‐value  m  SR  p‐value  SR  p‐value 
FE  1  0.140  ‐  0.125 ‐ 2 0.059 ‐  0.143 ‐
CP  0.106  0.220  0.059 0.016 0.058 0.497  ‐0.001 0.000
CP+Macro  0.045  0.016  0.030 0.003 ‐0.007 0.068  ‐0.053 0.000
FE  2  0.164  ‐  0.165 ‐ 3 0.108 ‐  0.153 ‐
CP  0.084  0.038  0.025 0.000 0.060 0.148  0.027 0.000
CP+Macro  0.030  0.002  ‐0.025 0.000 0.041 0.034  ‐0.038 0.000
FE  3  0.179  ‐  0.154 ‐ 4 0.127 ‐  0.193 ‐
CP  0.068  0.003  0.035 0.000 0.111 0.296  0.088 0.000
CP+Macro  0.053  0.001  ‐0.024 0.000 0.083 0.109  0.014 0.000
FE  6  0.162  ‐  0.174 ‐ 5 0.172 ‐  0.231 ‐
CP  0.142  0.197  0.096 0.003 0.165 0.294  0.133 0.000
CP+Macro  0.057  0.001  0.036 0.000 0.110 0.024  0.052 0.000
FE  9  0.367  ‐  0.255 ‐ 6 0.218 0.257
CP  0.123  0.000  0.147 0.000 0.196 0.493  0.166 0.000
CP+Macro  0.071  0.000  0.081 0.000 0.112 0.002  0.084 0.000
FE  12  0.350  ‐  0.236 ‐ 7 0.279 ‐  0.274 ‐
CP  0.137  0.000  0.141 0.001 0.184 0.005  0.173 0.000
CP+Macro  0.059  0.000  0.055 0.000 0.122 0.000  0.069 0.000
FE  24  0.407  0.509 ‐ 8 0.282 ‐  0.270 ‐
CP  0.143  0.000  0.236 0.000 0.149 0.000  0.188 0.000
CP+Macro  0.081  0.000  0.111 0.000 0.088 0.000  0.086 0.000
FE  36  0.595  ‐  0.576 ‐ 9 0.301 ‐  0.286 ‐
CP  0.256  0.000  0.234 0.000 0.191 0.000  0.215 0.000
CP+Macro  0.160  0.000  0.208 0.000 0.120 0.000  0.115 0.000
FE  48  0.669  ‐  0.624 ‐ 10 0.296 ‐  0.279 ‐
CP  0.371  0.018  0.151 0.000 0.177 0.000  0.209 0.000
CP+Macro  0.362  0.000  0.209 0.000 0.122 0.000  0.115 0.000
FE  60  0.526  ‐  0.588 ‐ 11 0.292 ‐  0.282 ‐
CP  0.377  0.003  0.098 0.000 0.185 0.000  0.198 0.000
CP+Macro  0.383  0.047  0.045 0.000 0.108 0.000  0.104 0.000
FE  12 0.295 ‐  0.266 ‐
CP  0.171 0.000  0.191 0.000
CP+Macro       0.065 0.000  0.091 0.000
Notes: This table compares the out-of-sample performance of the behavioral strategies to that of the CP and CP+Macro 
strategies. Panel A reports results for FE-based strategy for holding horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months 
and Panel B for ER-based strategy for holding horizons m = 2 to 12 months. Results are reported under both Strategy A and 
Strategy B. The column labeled “SR” reports the Sharpe ratios for the different strategies. The column labeled “p-value” 
reports the p-value of the difference between the Sharpe ratio of the FE strategy from that of the risk-based strategy indicated 
by the row label. The p-values are computed using the methodology in Jobson and Korkie (1981) with the Memmel (2003) 
correction. ARMA-based pre-whitened trading rule returns are used in the test. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012. 
  
 
Table 12 Strategy Alphas 
Panel A: FE Strategy Panel B: ER Strategy
m  Intercept  ܴܺܤ  ܯ஼௉ி  ܯగ  ܯ௚  ܯ௏௢௟  ࡾഥ૛  m  Intercept  ܴܺܤ  ܯ஼௉ி  ܯగ  ܯ௚  ܯ௏௢௟  ࡾഥ૛ 
1  1.025**  0.320** ‐0.101  0.155 ‐0.923* 0.572 0.403 2 0.052  0.270** 0.083 ‐0.161 ‐0.628 0.573 0.224 
(2.869)  (6.433) (‐0.669)  (0.701) (‐1.727) (1.479) (0.193)  (2.965) (0.765) (‐0.977) (‐1.315) (1.356)
2  1.052**  0.246** ‐0.009  ‐0.080 ‐0.631 0.586 0.198 3 0.375  0.309** 0.012 ‐0.030 ‐0.176 0.092 0.266 
(3.449)  (2.588) (‐0.072)  (‐0.531) (‐1.242) (1.434) (1.193)  (4.134) (0.117) (‐0.228) (‐0.481) (0.296)
3  0.783**  0.313** ‐0.125  0.068 ‐0.083 0.421 0.342 4 0.468  0.310** ‐0.136 0.103 ‐0.229 0.099 0.286 
(2.048)  (3.343) (‐1.163)  (0.469) (‐0.236) (1.490) (1.546)  (4.165) (‐1.247) (0.715) (‐0.827) (0.405)
6  0.755*  0.247** 0.087  ‐0.231** ‐0.872** 0.449* 0.149 5 0.671*  0.300** 0.044 ‐0.152** ‐0.701** 0.398 0.252 
(1.722)  (2.831) (1.518)  (‐2.870) (‐3.221) (1.925) (1.810)  (3.993) (0.577) (‐1.985) (‐2.665) (1.635)
9  1.453**  0.259** ‐0.026  ‐0.110 ‐0.168 0.190 0.179 6 0.915**  0.292** 0.059 ‐0.115 ‐0.503* 0.203 0.218 
(2.799)  (2.659) (‐0.398)  (‐1.516) (‐0.839) (1.060) (2.279)  (3.733) (0.906) (‐1.487) (‐1.651) (0.674)
12  1.458**  0.188 0.083  ‐0.163** ‐0.477* 0.280 0.076 7 1.320**  0.290** 0.096 ‐0.249** ‐0.578** 0.340 0.190 
(2.126)  (1.137) (1.440)  (‐2.103) (‐1.947) (1.273) (2.645)  (3.075) (1.396) (‐2.962) (‐2.430) (1.491)
24  0.928**  0.311** ‐0.013  ‐0.064 ‐0.070 0.070 0.242 8 1.301**  0.203* 0.097 ‐0.244** ‐0.693** 0.492** 0.096 
(3.149)  (3.911) (‐0.369)  (‐1.462) (‐0.449) (0.433) (2.509)  (1.793) (1.084) (‐2.545) (‐2.878) (2.405)
36  1.456**  ‐0.157 ‐0.014  ‐0.016 ‐0.077 0.118** 0.067 9 1.280**  0.162 0.034 ‐0.171** ‐0.528** 0.502** 0.068 
(4.746)  (‐1.013) (‐0.533)  (‐0.489) (‐0.705) (2.196) (2.406)  (1.258) (0.493) (‐2.512) (‐2.153) (2.653)
48  1.382**  ‐0.154 0.002  ‐0.005 ‐0.133* 0.155** 0.055 10 1.250**  0.124 0.053 ‐0.173** ‐0.643** 0.484** 0.042 
(5.101)  (‐1.002) (0.098)  (‐0.265) (‐1.755) (2.390) (2.356)  (0.903) (0.981) (‐2.721) (‐2.835) (2.424)
60  1.569**  ‐0.246 0.055*  ‐0.074** ‐0.031 0.047 0.051 11 1.144**  0.106 ‐0.053 ‐0.015 ‐0.379* 0.310 0.040 
(3.806)  (‐1.169) (1.937)  (‐2.307) (‐0.307) (0.541) (2.263)  (0.795) (‐0.932) (‐0.191) (‐1.859) (1.604)
12 1.289**  0.143 0.019 ‐0.115 ‐0.608** 0.461** 0.049 
(2.238)  (0.918) (0.255) (‐1.171) (‐2.490) (2.160)
Notes: The table presents the results of estimating equation (19) in the main text. Results are reported under Strategy A only. Panel A reports results for FE-based strategy for 
holding horizons m = 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months and Panel B for ER-based strategy for holding horizons m = 2 to 12 months. ܴܺܤ denotes the excess returns on 
a portfolio of long-term Treasury bonds measured over m-month horizon. ܯం represents the monthly return on the mimicking portfolio for risk variable ߓ ൌ CPF,	ߨ, ݃, ݋ݎ	Vol, 
where CPF is the CP forward-rate factor, ߨ is the inflation rate, ݃ is a measure of economic growth and ܸ݋݈ is a measure of bond market volatility. Intercept  (the regression 
constant) is the time-series alpha, expressed in percent per year. The figure in parentheses below each coefficient estimate is the Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistic. തܴଶ 
is the adjusted R-squared. ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The sample period is from 01/1952 to 12/2012.  
 
 
